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PRELIMINARY DRAFT
Abstract. We investigate the empirical validity of the median voter theory of trade policy. Mayer’s clas-
sic framework predicts that the optimal tariff is positive for a capital-abundant country and negative for a
labor-abundant country (Mayer, 1984). However, import subsidies are rare so the tariff level prediction seems
unrealistic. In this paper we examine two approaches to reconcile the theory with the lack of “pro-trade” bias
across countries. First, we test the variation inequality-tariff prediction proposed by Dutt and Mitra (2002). We
find support for it using human capital during the 1980s and 1990s. Using physical capital, the prediction is
validated for the 1990s but not for the 1980s. Second, we extend the Mayer framework to a large country. The
tariff level in a large country is the sum of the median voter component and a positive terms of trade component.
We provide empirical evidence for this level prediction and a positive terms of trade component in the 1990s.
Using human capital, we find that the median voter component is positive in capital-abundant countries and
negative in labor-abundant countries. Consequently, positive terms of trade effects can overcome the median
voter component in labor-abundant countries, reconciling theory with observed protectionism.
We are grateful to Bob Staiger for reviewing the draft and for several helpful comments. We thank Scott
Gehlbach, Devashish Mitra, John Morrow, Alan Spearot and Ken West for comments. Pushan Dutt kindly pro-
vided us with the original dataset and Bruce Hansen with the threshold estimation code. The usual disclaimer
applies.
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1 Introduction
“If, by an overwhelming consensus among economists, trade should be free, then why is it that
nearly everywhere we look, and however far back, trade is in chains?”
Gawande and Krishna (2005)
For decades theorists have been putting forward ideas to explain the existence of protectionism, leading
to a large body of theories that endogenize trade policy.1 Two major categories are special interest and direct
democracy theories. Within the direct democracy category, an implication of the median voter theory of trade
policy (Mayer, 1984) has been empirically tested for the 1980s by Dutt and Mitra (2002).
The Mayer hypothesis asserts that “each factor owner has an optimal tariff whose value is uniquely related
to the individual’s factor ownership. In the special case of majority voting with no voting costs, it is the median
factor owner’s optimal tariff rate that will be chosen to become the actual tariff rate” (Mayer, 1984, pp. 971).
In the Mayer-Heckscher-Ohlin setting, when the median voter owns a small share of aggregate capital in the
country, the optimal tariff is positive for a capital-abundant country and negative for a labor-abundant country.
However import subsidies are rarely observed in practice. As a result, the level of tariff prediction seems
unrealistic. So how can Mayer’s import subsidization result be reconciled with the lack of “pro-trade” bias
across countries? We examine two avenues to investigate the empirical validity of the median voter theory of
trade policy.
First, we consider a comparative static result of Mayer’s model, the variation in tariffs prediction. Unlike
other models of political economy of trade policy, Mayer’s median voter theory provides a clear theoretical
relationship between tariffs and inequality. Mayer’s variation prediction implies that higher inequality in fac-
tor ownership would cause tariff rates to rise in capital-rich countries and to fall in capital-scarce ones. Dutt
and Mitra (2002) found support for this inequality-tariff implication for a cross-section of countries in the
1980s, suggesting that the median voter model has some empirical relevance. In this paper, we re-examine the
inequality-tariff relationship studied by Dutt & Mitra (2002). Our results show that their finding is not robust.
Instead we find that when human capital and (unskilled) labor are taken as relevant factors, the Mayer impli-
cation is validated in the 1980s. Using cross-sectional country data, we also find that the Mayer implication
holds for the 1990s with either physical capital or human capital. Our findings are robust to several estimation
methods including threshold regression. They reveal that the Mayer variation prediction is empirically relevant.
Second, we extend the Mayer model to large countries and consider the extended level of tariffs prediction.
1See Gawande and Krishna (2005) for a survey of the literature on political economy of trade policy.
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Previous work has found strong empirical support for the optimal tariff argument which states that large coun-
tries set positive tariffs in order to improve their terms of trade. Empirical evidence reveals that even countries
with very small shares in world GDP have the ability to influence their terms of trade (Broda et al, 2006 and
Olarreaga et al, 1999). So several countries can be considered “large” implying that terms of trade considera-
tions play a decisive role in tariff-setting. Accordingly, we extend Mayer’s model to a large country and obtain
tariff levels as a function of the median voter component and a positive terms of trade factor. Consequently, if
a large labor-abundant country has sufficient market power, the positive terms of trade component dominates
the negative median voter component and the optimal tariff is positive. Hence this simple extension overcomes
the import subsidization result for labor-abundant countries with sufficient market power. We test the extended
level prediction for the 1990s and find a positive relationship between terms of trade considerations and tariff
levels across countries. Using human capital, we show that the median voter component has a negative impact
on tariffs in labor-abundant countries and a positive impact in capital-abundant countries.
Thus we find empirical support for both the comparative static result and the level prediction of the M-H-O
theory. Our results are consistent with micro-level findings of the relevance of human capital as a determinant
of preferences over trade policy (e.g. Balistreri (1997), Scheve and Slaughter (2001), Mayda and Rodrik (2005)
and O’Rourke and Sinnott (2001)).
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. We start with a discussion of prior work related to the median
voter model and the terms of trade theory. The theoretical foundations of the small-country model and its
implications are provided in Section 2. In Section 3, we set up the empirical model for the variation prediction.
Section 4 explains our data sources and contains a summary of the data used in the paper. Section 5 comprises
of our results for the variation prediction. First, we contrast our findings with those of Dutt and Mitra (DM
hereafter) for the 1980s. Then we test the Mayer hypothesis using data on both human capital and physical
capital in the 1990s. We discuss the results and their robustness. In Section 6, we extend Mayer’s model to a
large country followed by the empirical model to test the large country level prediction. We lay out the results
for the large country level prediction. Finally we present our conclusions.
1.1 Related Work
While DM take an indirect approach, several others have directly examined the validity of the tariff-factor
ownership link and found support for it. For instance, Scheve and Slaughter (2001), Mayda and Rodrik (2005)
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and O’Rourke and Sinnott (2001) use survey data to confirm that individual preferences over trade policy
depend on factor ownership. Balistreri (1997) finds support for HOV in the voting preferences of Canadians
regarding the Canadian-US Free Trade Agreement (1989).
Beaulieu and Magee (2004) use Political Action Committee (PAC) contribution data and find that the factor
represented by the PAC is more important than industry in determining support for NAFTA and GATT in
the US. This is consistent with the M-H-O model in that “capital groups consistently back representatives
supporting trade liberalization while labor groups favor protectionists” (pp. 163). So at a more aggregate level
than individual data, there is some evidence supporting the level prediction that capital owners favor tariff
reductions and vice-versa. But when we consider trade policies across countries, we rarely observe a “pro-
trade” bias (Dutt and Mitra 2002, pp. 109). However the empirical validity of the model can be salvaged by
two key extensions.
Variation Prediction
The first extension was proposed by DM who tested the variation prediction of the median voter model.
Mayer’s precise implication for tariffs and inequality is in contrast to other political economy models of trade
policy. In particular, DM explain that when a lobbying approach is used in a similar two-sector two-factor
constant returns to scale setup such as Rodrik (1986), the opposite prediction follows. An increase in capital
inequality results in lower protection in capital-rich countries and vice-versa. On the other hand, when a
lobbying model with specific factors is used, there are no clear cross-country predictions since the impact of
an increase in inequality on trade barriers is highly sensitive to the costs of forming lobbies in each country
(Feenstra 2003, pp. 311-15). Similarly, within the median voter model with specific factors, the relationship
between tariffs and inequality is highly sensitive to the median voter’s share of each specific factor and the
elasticity of substitution between the mobile and specific factor in each sector. DM provide an empirical
relationship between tariffs and inequality which is consistent with the M-H-O model. Thus their variation test
lends some “tentative” support to the Mayer median voter model.2
We use DM’s approach of examining the variation prediction and extend their analysis to the 1990s. Our
time period covers the liberalization of several countries - at least 13 - which includes some major developing
countries (Greenaway et al, 1997). Further, we use new measures of trade restrictiveness following Anderson
and Neary (2003). Our results reveal an interesting difference - in the 1980s, the Mayer implication does not
find strong empirical support when it is tested for physical capital and unskilled labor but it holds when we
2Gawande and Krishna (2005), pp. 11. Note that DM use lagged inequality and perform several checks for endogeneity bias. We
follow a similar approach in our estimation.
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compare skilled labor with unskilled labor. In the 1990s however, the Mayer implication holds with either
physical or human capital.
The relevance of human capital is consistent with previous empirical work on the median voter theory of
trade policy. Other than DM, all papers mentioned earlier compare trade preferences of unskilled versus skilled
labor rather than physical capital. Thus they corroborate our finding regarding suitability of human capital
as the second factor in Mayer’s framework.3 But they use a direct micro-level approach to explore the trade
preference-factor ownership link. We are interested in finding out whether the preference of the median voter
actually manifests itself in the form of her country’s adopted trade policy, so we use DM’s approach.
Extended Level Prediction
Second, we extend the Mayer model to a large country and obtain a level of tariff prediction. Within the
special interest category of political economy models, the Protection for Sale model (Grossman and Helpman,
1994) has been empirically examined by Gawande & Li (2005) in a large country setup. We consider a direct
democracy large country model instead. Our extension to the large country case is consistent with previous
work which stresses the importance of terms of trade considerations for several countries. In particular, Olar-
reaga et al (1999) find that terms of trade considerations account for about 6 to 28 per cent of the explained
variation in tariffs across commodities for MERCOSUR countries even though MERCOSUR’s share in world
imports is just one per cent. Broda et al (2006) emphasize the role of regional market power and find that even
countries with small shares in world GDP set higher tariffs on account of terms of trade considerations, at both
the aggregate and disaggregate levels.4
In a large country framework, trade agreements that conform to reciprocity can increase welfare levels
of each participating country via reciprocal trade liberalization (Bagwell and Staiger, 1999). Since our time
period covers the formation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), we expect WTO members to engage
in a mutual re-adjustment of their tariffs. Consequently, we allow the slope parameters of the terms of trade
component to be determined separately for members and non-members of the WTO while testing the extended
level prediction for the 1990s. As expected, we find that non-members set higher tariffs than members of the
WTO. This is consistent with the empirical evidence provided by Bagwell and Staiger (2006) for the terms of
trade theory of trade agreements.
3Beaulieu and Magee (2004) segregate PACs into corporate PACs and labor PACs so there is no clear distinction between physical and
human capital in their paper.
4Both these papers include a commodity-level analysis of tariffs so the chosen political economy variables are those implied by special
interest group theories.
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2 Theoretical Model: Small Country
We retain all the assumptions of the M-H-O model (Mayer, 1984). There are two sectors and two factors -
labor (L) and capital (K) - in the economy. Each agent (i) owns a unit of labor (Li = 1) and a certain fraction
(σi) of the total capital stock in the economy (so Ki = σiK is person i’s capital stock). Labor and capital are
needed to produce two goods (1 and 2). Production functions for the two goods are homogeneous of degree
one. Both factors are perfectly mobile across these two industries. So a unit of labor earns a wage rate (w) and
a unit of capital earns a rental rate (r), irrespective of the industry of employment. An agent who owns a unit of
labor and Ki units of capital earns total factor income equal to w + rKi. Thus individual i’s share in national
rewards from factor ownership is
φi =
w + rKi
wL+ rK
(1)
In addition to factor earnings, agents receive a part of the national tariff revenue. Suppose the domestic
country importsM amount of good 1. Let t be the domestic import duty or tariff rate imposed on good 1. Let pi
denote the world relative price of good 1 in terms of good 2. Then the domestic country obtains national tariff
revenue worth T = tpiM . Mayer assumes that tariff sharing is neutral with respect to the overall distribution
of income. This implies that if agent i earns φi of the total factor rewards in the economy, then she receives φi
of the total tariff revenue T . In other words, the amount of tariff revenue received by individual i is T i = φiT .
Thus individual i’s total income (yi) can be expressed as
yi = w + rKi + T i = φi(wL+ rK + T ) = φiY
On the demand side, Mayer assumes that all agents have identical and homothetic preferences over goods.
Both goods are normal and traded in competitive markets. So p = pi(1 + t) is the domestic price of good
1 in terms of good 2. Consumers have strictly concave utility functions. Individual i chooses the tariff level
that maximizes her utility subject to her budget constraint. The optimization problem of individual i can be
expressed in terms of her indirect utility function U i.
max
ti
U i
(
p
(
pi, ti
)
, yi
)
, i = 1, ..., I
It follows that agent i’s optimal tariff choice is t˜i.
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t˜i =
(
− Y
pi dMdt
)(
dφi
dt
φi
)
(2)
Thus in equilibrium, each voter has an optimal tariff rate that is unique to her factor ownership ratio. According
to the median voter hypothesis with single-peaked preferences, the adopted policy is determined by the median
voter’s (mv) preference. So the adopted trade policy in the domestic country is:
t˜ = t˜mv =
(
− Y
pi dMdt
)(
dφmv
dt
φmv
)
(3)
Using Equation (1) and Jones’ hat algebra,
dφmv
dt
=
[
L
(Y − T )2
]
(1− σmv)K
(
r
dw
dt
− wdr
dt
)
=
[
wL
(Y − T )2
]
(1− σmv)rK
(1 + t)
(
wˆ − rˆ
pˆ
)
This equation implies that the individual-specific income effect depends on two elements - the median voter’s
capital share relative to the nation (σmv) and the relative factor intensity of the import industry which deter-
mines wˆ−rˆpˆ . The first element is assumed to be negative across countries i.e. σ
mv < 1.5
The sign of the second element depends on the factor abundance of the country. In particular, the derivative
is positive for a capital-abundant country and negative for a capital-scarce country. This is because an increase
in tariff raises the domestic price of the imported good. So by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, this results in
a higher income share for the agent if she is relatively well-endowed with the factor that is used intensively in
the production of the import good. By the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, a capital-abundant country imports the
labor-intensive good while a capital-scarce country imports the capital-intensive good. So in a capital-abundant
country, an increase in the price of the imported labor-intensive good will lead to a higher factor reward for labor
and a lower factor reward for capital making (wˆ−rˆ)pˆ positive and vice-versa. This implies that the derivative is
positive for a capital-abundant country and negative for a capital-scarce country.
Proposition. Small Country Level Prediction:
The median voter in a small capital-abundant country supports tariffs on imports, while the median voter
in a small capital-scarce country supports subsidies on imports. Thus by the median voter theorem, small
capital-abundant countries support tariffs on imports, while small capital-scarce countries support subsidies
on imports.
5We confirm this assumption in our empirical work. For further discussion, see Alesina and Rodrik (1994).
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Import subsidies are rarely observed in practice. So DM leave this level prediction aside and ask a different
question: What happens to trade barriers, if inequality increases, i.e. σmv ≡ KmvK falls? Using Equation (2)
and holding other things equal,
∂t˜
∂σmv
= −A (wˆ − rˆ)
pˆ
(4)
where A > 0. From the earlier argument, this equation yields the following prediction for variation in tariffs
across countries.
Proposition. Small Country Variation Prediction:
Higher inequality causes tariff rates to rise in capital-rich countries and to fall in capital-scarce ones.
Thus as pointed out by DM, we can use cross-country data on variations in trade barriers (instead of their
actual levels) to assess the impact of differences in inequality on differences in trade policy. This would provide
an indication of the empirical validity of Mayer’s model.
3 Empirical Model: Variation Prediction
We start this section with an empirical model of the variation prediction. Let tc be a measure of trade
barriers in country c and σmvc be a measure of capital equality. Let kc ≡ (K/L)c be the mean capital-labor
ratio in country c and k∗ be the threshold capital-labor ratio that divides countries into capital-scarce and
capital-abundant categories. Let γScarce denote the parameters to be estimated for capital scarce countries (
kc ≤ k∗). Similarly let γAbundant denote the parameters for countries which are relatively capital abundant
(kc > k∗). Let  denote the vector of error terms. Since we are interested in the relationship between tariffs
and inequality predicted by Equation (4), a linear approximation yields the following empirical model.
t˜c = γScarceσmvc + c if kc ≤ k∗
= γAbundantσmvc + c if kc > k
∗ (5)
The Mayer variation prediction implies that γScarce is positive while γAbundant is negative. But estimation
of these parameters entails determination of the threshold value k∗ which is unknown. In order to estimate the
parameters and the threshold value, DM used the following linear regression with an interaction term.
t˜c = γ1σmvc + γ2σ
mv
c kc + γ3kc +X
′
cδ + εc (6)
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where Xc is a vector of control variables, δ is a vector of parameters and ε denotes the vector of errors. This
specification yields
∂t˜c
∂σmvc
= γ1 + γ2kc
If γ1 > 0 and γ2 < 0, then we obtain a critical capital-labor ratio (k∗) defined by ∂t˜c∂σmvc = γ1 + γ2k
∗ = 0
which implies that capital-scarce countries have ∂t˜c∂σmvc > 0 and capital-abundant countries have
∂t˜c
∂σmvc
< 0. The
interaction term in (6) allows the sign of ∂t˜c∂σmvc to vary across subgroups of countries so we get an endogenous
split in the sample that groups countries into categories of high and low aggregate capital stock. Thus a test for
the Mayer variation prediction is to check if γ1 and γ2 estimated using (6) have the expected signs summarized
in Table 1. The capital per worker term (kc) is included to allow the sign of its coefficient (γ3) to differ from
the sign of the interaction term coefficient (γ2).
The specification in (6) has the advantage of allowing individual determination of the ∂t˜c∂σmvc parameters
but relies on a restrictive method of estimating the threshold value. In particular, the sum of squared errors
is minimized with respect to the parameters but not the threshold value. In order to improve on this estima-
tion, we will supplement the DM approach with the threshold regression method proposed by Hansen (2000)
to estimate γScarce, γAbundant and k∗ in Equation (5). The method proposed by Hansen (2000) yields pa-
rameter and threshold estimates that jointly minimize the sum of squared errors. First parameter estimates are
obtained through least squares conditional on a threshold value and then the conditional sum of squared errors
is minimized to get the threshold estimate.6 We will test whether the parameter estimates from the threshold
regression have the signs implied by Mayer’s variation prediction as summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Variation Test
Linear Regressions Threshold Regressions
Coefficient Expected Sign Coefficient Expected Sign
γ1 (+) γScarce (+)
γ2 (-) γAbundant (-)
6A caveat is in order here regarding the threshold estimation. Hansen (2000) notes that when the parameters are same across regimes,
the threshold is not identified and standard inference methods are invalid. So the confidence interval for the threshold estimate is based
on its likelihood ratio statistic. The validity of this confidence interval relies on the assumption that the difference between the parameters
across regimes converges to zero as the sample size gets infinitely large. We will use cross-sectional data for our analysis and have no a
priori reason to believe that the tariff-inequality relationship converges across regimes when the sample size increases. As a result we will
use Theorem 3 of Hansen (2000) since it does not rely on the convergence assumption. It should be noted however that the confidence
intervals in this case are conservative.
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4 Data
Sources
Our data sources can be divided into two parts. Part 1 pertains to the 1980s. Part 2 pertains to the time
period 1988-2002.
Part 1
To compare our results with those of DM, we use their original dataset for all variables (including capital-labor
ratios). Data on inequality - income ginis and share of third quintile in national income - are from the original
dataset of DM. In the absence of asset inequality measures, income inequality measures are used as proxies for
capital inequality as in DM. We use DM’s data on tariff and import duties as measures of trade restrictiveness.
Tariff is an average of tariffs and charges imposed on imports and weighted by the share of world trade of each
good. Import duties refer to the total import duties collected as a percentage of aggregate imports.
DM used two other measures of trade protection (X+M)/GDP (share of trade in GDP) and coverage ratio
of quotas. However both these measures are unsatisfactory and results using these measures cannot be taken as
evidence for or against the Mayer hypothesis. The former is usually higher in smaller countries and is known
to suffer from causality issues. And the latter, as pointed out by DM, suffers from severe measurement error.
Thus we do not use these two measures in this paper.
For other regressions in part 1, we use data on capital-labor ratios and human capital available in Baier et
al (2006). DM use K/L in logarithmic form. We follow this approach for both physical and human capital.
Part 2
For part 2, we use trade restrictiveness indices (TRIs) estimated by Kee et al (2006) for the period 1993-2002.
The TRI is based on Anderson and Neary (2003) and has the advantage of being a composite measure of trade
protection which accounts for tariffs, duties and non-tariff barriers (See Appendix C for formal definition).
Further it does not suffer from underestimation problems unlike the import-weighted average tariff. These
indices are not available for the 1980s so for part 1, we use DM’s data on tariff and import duties.
Human capital and physical capital estimates for part 2 are from Baier et al (2006). An average of values for
1990 and 2000 were taken. As a robustness check, we use human capital stock estimated by Cohen and Soto
(2001). Gini coefficients and quintile shares of income in part 2 are taken from the World Income Inequality
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Database (WIID2), which is a corrected and updated version of the Deininger & Squire income inequality
database.
Data on the instruments in part 2 - population growth rates, saving rates, M2/GDP and GDP are from
World Development Indicators 2005 and on land ginis from the Dutt and Mitra (2002) dataset. Polity variables
(political rights and civil liberties) of part 2 are from the Freedom House Gastil Index.
For the level test, data on GDP, labor, population and tax revenue are from World Development Indicators
2006. The non-membership dummy is categorized as one for countries that were not members of the WTO
during the time period 1995-2002. Import elasticities, import quantities and import values were taken from the
Trade and Production Database of the World Bank. Import elasticities have been estimated using data for the
period 1988-2002 (Kee et al 2004). For each variable in our analysis, averages of all available years from 1988
to 2002 were taken so that the effects of explanatory variables on trade barriers could be accounted for. Using
different lags of right-hand side variables does not change our qualitative results.
Description
Before laying out the empirical results, we briefly discuss the data used in the empirical tests.
Part 1
Key variables used in the empirical test for the 1980s are tariff, import duty, Gini index, median quintile’s share
in national income (Q3), physical capital-labor ratio (K/L) and human capital index (HKI).
We use three different measures of K/L ratios. The physical capital-labor ratio ranges from 170 to 166,476
for our largest dataset (Baier et al, 2006). The most capital-scarce country is Madagascar while the most
capital-abundant country is Kuwait. The K/L ratios are similar across the three datasets for countries that do
not export oil. But there are substantial discrepancies in the K/L ratios of oil-exporting nations. For instance,
K/L estimates for Nigeria range from 1,000 to 3,960 and for Venezuela from 20,500 to 47,500. DM used a
dummy to indicate oil-exporting countries. We have confirmed the validity of our key results using a dummy
for oil-exporting countries. However to avoid bias in the estimates of key coefficients and the turning point due
to the discrepancies in K/L data, we have excluded all oil-exporting nations in our regressions. This amounts
to dropping two to three observations in each regression.
Tariff ranges from 0.01 to 1.32 across countries. However India is a clear outlier since the maximum tariff
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across all countries excluding India is 0.41. Import duty ranges from 0.06 to 41.38 when India is included in
the sample. But the maximum import duty falls to 35.7 when India is excluded. Summary statistics for the
entire sample of countries are presented in Table 2.
Human capital index ranges from 2.13 (Niger) to 7.14 (USA). Q3 shares are lowest in South Africa while
Gini is highest in Lesotho. The highest Q3 shares and lowest Gini indices are in Western Europe and the Czech
Republic. Countries showing the lowest political rights ranking are Ethiopia, Guinea, Pakistan and Bolivia.
Table 2: Summary Statistics
Part 1 (1980s) Part 2 (1990s)
Obs Mean S.D. Min Max Obs Mean S.D. Min Max
Tariff 86 0.18 0.17 0.01 1.32 TRI 80 0.17 0.1 0.02 0.55
M -Duty 86 12.1 8.45 0.01 41.4
Q3 69 14.4 2.43 9.2 18.5 Q3 41 15.48 2.27 11.3 21.1
Gini 56 42 9 26.4 62.6 Gini 80 40.41 10.4 24.8 65
K/L (’000) 102 21 23 0.17 166 K/L (’000) 80 24 23 0.13 80
HKI 102 4.14 1.26 2.13 7.14 HKI 80 4.8 1.35 2.3 7.3
Part 2
For the variation prediction in the 1990s, key variables are the trade restrictiveness index (TRI), Gini index, Q3,
K/L and HKI. Summary statistics of these variables for the entire sample of countries are presented in Table 2.
TRI is lowest in Estonia and greater than 0.4 in three countries (Tanzania, Algeria and Nigeria). Our results
in the subsequent sections are robust to exclusion of these countries. Inequality measured by Gini is lowest in
the Czech Republic and European Union countries. It is highest in Zimbabwe. Once again, Western Europe
is the region with highest physical capital while USA is the most skill-abundant. As earlier, Madagascar has
the lowest K/L ratio. The most skill-scarce countries are Mali and Ethiopia. Countries with the lowest political
rights are Laos, Cameroon, Vietnam and China.
5 Results: Variation Prediction
For the specification in (6), we use TRI (overall trade restrictiveness index) as a measure of tc in the 1990s
and tariffs & import duties in the 1980s. As in DM, we use Income Gini coefficients as well as Q3 (median
quintile’s share in national income) as proxies for capital inequality.
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Comparison with DM results (1980s)
First we present DM’s results for the 1980s using the Summers-Heston (S-H) capital data and compare them
with our findings.7 In their paper, DM reported two key regressions - reduced regression (without control
variables) and controlled regression (with five control variables). We use the same dataset and sample of
countries as DM. We are able to replicate DM’s results but find that their results are highly sensitive to the
countries included in the sample. Each of their regressions includes India which is a clear outlier. For instance,
in the case of tariffs, for a sample of 92 countries excluding India, the mean tariff is 0.16 and the maximum is
0.48. India on the other hand has a tariff of 1.32. This is reflected in the high values of studentized residuals
in each regression. The studentized residuals for India range from 8.8 to 14 for tariff regressions and from 4
to 6 for import duty regressions. Thus India is an outlier in each regression. Given the small sizes of samples,
this poses an acute problem which can be exacerbated when another influential observation is present in the
sample. We find that two of the eight regressions have an influential observation (Sierra Leone) which has
absolute DFbeta values in excess of 2 for at least one of the key variables. Exclusion of India and Sierra Leone
(when it is an influential observation) from regression samples has a dramatic effect on six out of eight of
DM’s regression results. The coefficient values for two key variables (inequality measure and interaction term)
change and their significance levels drop so drastically that we can no longer reject the null hypothesis that
these coefficients are zero. Results for tariffs are presented in Table 3.
It is clear that the coefficient values and significance levels are very sensitive to the countries used in the
sample. However the insignificance of key variables cannot be taken as evidence against the Mayer implication
because our estimates suffer from a classic symptom of multicollinearity - large standard errors of individual
variables and high R-squared coefficients. The bivariate correlation of the inequality term (Gini or Q3) and the
corresponding interaction terms ranges from 0.86 to 0.91. We tested for the joint significance of the first two
variables Gini (Q3) and Gini*(K/L) (Q3*(K/L)), but our results are inconclusive. For some of the regressions,
the null hypothesis of joint insignificance can be rejected but for others it cannot. Further the results are
extremely sensitive to dropping of one or two observations. We tried centering the data on Gini and Q3 but the
problem persisted.
Results for four other regressions - using tariffs or import duties and Easterly-Levine capital-labor ratios -
are similar so they are reported in Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix C. In the remaining two regressions using import
duties and Summers-Heston capital-labor ratios, DM’s qualitative results do not change when India is dropped
7DM used the Nehru-Dhareshwar (ND) capital-labor ratios for their main regressions. We do not report these results due to inconsis-
tencies in the ND dataset which have been confirmed by DM in a personal communication.
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Table 3: Dependent Variable: Tariff - Using Summer-Heston’s (K/L) ratio
(a) DM (b) W/o outliers (c) DM (d) W/o outliers
Compare w/DM Same Different Compare w/DM Same Different
Gini -0.144** -0.046 Q3 0.324*** 0.021
(0.06) (0.04) (0.09) (0.08)
Gini * (K/L) 0.014** 0.005 Q3 * (K/L) -0.034*** -0.004
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
(K/L) -0.938*** -0.288† (K/L) 0.275** -0.037
(0.26) (0.17) (0.13) (0.12)
Schooling 0.035† 0.013 Schooling 0.005 0.004
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Pol. Rights -0.006 -0.002 Pol. Rights -0.051* -0.023
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
SS Africa -0.345* 0.127 SS Africa -0.206* -0.072
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.07)
East Asia -0.257* 0.046 East Asia -0.126 0.006
(0.14) (0.09) (0.13) (0.07)
Oil 0.208† 0.146* Oil -0.039 0.027
(0.13) (0.08) (0.18) (0.10)
Constant 9.274*** 2.583† Constant -2.245* 0.812
(2.41) (1.69) (1.20) (1.11)
N 31 30 N 33 31
R2 0.7 0.62 R2 0.54 0.64
(K/L)* 10.3 (K/L)* 9.4
Obs excluded (#) 0 1 (India) Obs excl. (#) 0 2 (India, S. Le.)
Student Res. 11 Student Res. 8.8
Significance Levels: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent, † 15 percent.
from the sample. However we detect an endogeneity problem here and cannot reject the null hypothesis of
zero coefficients when DM’s instrumental variables are used (See Table 3, Appendix C). We used a robust
estimation technique (MM-estimation) to cross-check the sensitivity of DM’s results. Using the MM-estimator,
DM’s qualitative results are rejected in five out of eight cases.8
Overall the results from DM’s controlled regressions using physical capital to test the variation prediction
are not robust.
Reduced Specification of DM Regressions (1980s)
In the main regression (Table 3), DM used five control variables - schooling, political rights, oil and two regional
dummies for sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia. We argue that some of these control variables are inappropriate.
First, using schooling as a control variable has little theoretical justification. It is highly correlated with human
8Available at www.sdhingra.com. All unreported results are available from the author upon request.
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capital which is a separate factor (correlation coefficient of 0.9). Treating it as a control variable that accounts
for development or “people’s ability to figure out the dead-weight costs of distortionary government policies
favoring special interest groups” is not compelling (Dutt and Mitra (2002), pp. 124). Further the correlation
between schooling, K/L and political rights may explain the insignificance of some of these variables.
Second, while controlling for political rights and oil could be justified (See Appendix A for a formal ar-
gument), we think that exclusion of countries with low political rights and oil exports has greater merit. As
mentioned earlier, exclusion of oil countries is on account of a data issue. However, our key results are robust
to using a dummy variable for oil-exporting countries.
Exclusion of countries with low political rights is appropriate because Mayer is concerned with countries
which have majoritarian voting. Moreover it can be argued that individuals who have low capital endowment
in countries with relatively low political rights are likely to be disenfranchised. So the median voter among the
set of effective voters of a low political rights country has a higher income level than would be the case if the
country had a better political rights situation. In our dataset, the political rights variable (PR) takes on values
from 1 to 7, with 1 indicating the highest level of political rights. We present results for all our regressions
using the entire sample as well as a sub-sample of countries with political rights (PR) less than five. The subset
of countries with PR less than five corresponds to the top 75 per cent of countries in terms of political rights in
our entire sample.
While DM do not report the reduced regressions using the S-H and E-L datasets, we have checked that
including the two to three influential countries in the sample would yield results that support the Mayer impli-
cation. When these influential observations are dropped, the results once again lead to a rejection of the Mayer
hypothesis (Table 10, Appendix B). We find the key terms (inequality and interaction) to be individually signif-
icant in only one regression using tariffs. But for the corresponding regression using import duties, we get the
unexpected signs on our key estimates (Table 4, Appendix C). Once again there is a multicollinearity problem.
The R-squared coefficients for the regressions of inequality, interaction term and capital-labor ratios on each
other are over 0.95 in each case. We are able to reject the joint significance of our two key variables in all
regressions.9 Using threshold regressions, we find no support for the Mayer variation prediction using physical
capital (Table 12, Appendix B). However it should be noted here that in a different paper, Dutt and Mitra (2006)
provide evidence supporting the variation test with an expanded dataset of physical capital. Consequently, we
can say that the evidence in favor of the Mayer implication using physical capital in the 1980s is weak.
9However this has little meaning in the Q3 regressions as all three variables are highly correlated so we cannot separate their effects.
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Human Capital and Trade Barriers
Using physical capital as the relevant factor in Mayer’s framework in the 1980s, we can at best say that the
test is inconclusive and at worst say that the Mayer implication can be rejected. So the natural question is:
Since we do not find strong evidence regarding the Mayer implication in the 1980s, should we abandon the
Mayer hypothesis as an explanation for trade protection in this time period? Rejecting the hypothesis would
be inconsistent with results from other papers that have found an explicit link between trade preferences and
factor ownership of voters and their representatives. Previous work has compared preferences of skilled and
unskilled labor so it guides us to regard human capital as the relevant capital variable in Equation (4). And this
indeed supports the Mayer hypothesis.
In the remaining part of this section, we present evidence for the Mayer variation prediction for the 1980s
and 1990s. A summary of all results discussed in this section is provided below in Tables 4 and 5.
Table 4: Summary Results for Variation Prediction using Linear Regressions
Coef. Exp. Sign Physical Capital Human Capital
1980s 1990s 1980s 1990s
DM w/o Reduced Reduced Reduced Reduced
outliers Reg. Reg. Reg. Reg.
γ1 (+) Insignif. Insignif. (+) (+) (+)
γ2 (-) Insignif. Insignif. (-) (-) (-)
Table 5: Summary Results for Variation Prediction using Threshold Regressions
Coef. Exp. Sign Physical Capital Human Capital
1980s 1990s 1980s 1990s
γScarce (+) (+) (+) (+) (+)
γAbundant (-) Insignif. (-) (-) (-)
k∗ Sig./Insig. Sig. Sig. Sig.
Sig. = Significant at 5% , Insig. = Insignificant at 5% level
Human Capital and Trade Barriers (1980s)
Using human capital measures, we find support for the Mayer implication using both linear and threshold
regressions (TR). Not only are the results statistically significant and robust, but they also have the expected
theoretical interpretation. We find that the net effect of inequality on tariffs is positive in countries with higher
levels of human capital and negative in countries with scarce human capital resources (Tables 11 and 12,
Appendix B). So we find considerable support for the M-H-O model in the 1980s. Results using import duties
are similar so they are reported in Table 5 of Appendix C.
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Human Capital, Physical Capital and Trade Barriers (1990s)
Our next step is to check the link between trade restrictions and inequality in factor ownership in the 1990s.
For this time period, we have a larger dataset and superior measures of trade restrictiveness for our purposes.
We use both physical capital and human capital as relevant factors in separate linear and threshold regressions
presented in Tables 13, 14 and 15 of Appendix B.
Using linear regressions, we find remarkably similar results for the variation prediction. The Gini (Q3) term
in each case is negative (positive) and significant and the interaction term is positive (negative) and significant.
Our results are robust and often even stronger when countries with low political rights are excluded. The
split in the sample does not show any anomalous categorization (Figure 1) and the results clearly reflect the
difference in tariff-inequality relationship across the two categories of human-capital endowment (Figure 2).
Using threshold regressions, we find strong evidence for the Mayer variation prediction. Moreover we obtain a
similar value for the turning point of the sample.
These results imply that higher inequality is associated with greater protectionism in countries with higher
levels of physical capital and/or human capital, and with less restrictiveness in countries with lower levels of
physical capital and/or human capital during the 1990s.
Figure 1: Countries by Human Capital Index (Corresponds to Table 14, HKI* = 1.5)
Countries with high human capital Countries with low human capital
Albania Finland Nicaragua Bangladesh Kenya Thailand
Argentina France Norway Bolivia Kyrgyzstan Tunisia
Australia Germany Peru Brazil Laos Uganda
Austria Greece Philippines Cameroon Madagascar Vietnam
Belarus Hungary Poland C. Afr. Rep. Malawi Zambia
Belgium Ireland Portugal China Malaysia Zimbabwe
Canada Italy Romania Colombia Mali
Chile Latvia Spain El Salvador Mozambique
Costa Rica Lithuania Sweden Ethiopia Nepal
Czech Rep. Mexico Switzerland Ghana Pakistan
Denmark Moldova UK Guatemala Papua New G.
Ecuador Netherlands USA Honduras Paraguay
Estonia New Zealand Uruguay India Tanzania
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Figure 2: TRI-Inequality Relationship by Human Capital Index, 1990s
Human Capital Abundant Countries Human Capital Scarce Countries
Corresponds to Table 14 (a)
Figure 3: TRI, Human Capital, Gini (1990s): Non-Parametric Estimation
Local Estimation: γ1 < 0 and γ2 > 0
Robustness Check
Estimation
We tried other specifications for the threshold regressions. In particular, including an interaction or a squared
term for Gini makes no difference to the human capital regressions and these higher-order terms are statistically
insignificant. Regarding the physical capital regressions, the interaction term is statistically significant in only
one regression and the squared term is never statistically significant.
We also used a non-parametric method to determine the relationship between trade barriers and inequality.
We used the formulation of Equation (6) to obtain local estimates from a multivariate smoothing method for
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t˜c = f(σmvc , σ
mv
c kc, kc) + . In Figure 3, we present the relationship between TRI and the key variables -
Gini and Gini*HKI - using a partial locally weighted least squares smoother for each independent variable. As
expected, local estimation of f yields a TRI-Gini curve with a negative slope and a TRI-Gini*HKI curve with a
positive slope. Thus the local estimates are consistent with the results from the linear and threshold regressions.
We also used the MM-estimator for all reduced linear regressions. The variation prediction for physical
capital does not hold in three out of four cases. For reduced regressions using human capital, the variation
prediction holds in each regression.
Data, Variables and Endogeneity
The key results are unaltered when we use the Cohen-Soto human capital index (Table 6, Appendix C). Our
results are not sensitive to treatment of European Union member countries as one observation or to inclusion
of a dummy for post-communist countries. Our results do not suffer from endogeneity bias due to presence of
σmv and k as explanatory variables (See Appendix B).
We conclude that evidence supports the Mayer implication regarding trade preferences and ownership of
physical capital and/or human capital strongly in the 1990s. In the 1980s, this is true for ownership of human
capital but the same cannot be said about physical capital.
Discussion
How do we reconcile our different findings regarding physical and human capital? It can be argued that the
reason for our different findings could be simply that data on human capital (H) is better than data on physical
capital (K). Therefore we get inconclusive results with the latter in the 1980s. But this does not seem plausible
since greater dissatisfaction has been expressed with data on human capital (see de la Fuente and Doménech
(2002) for a review).
Another explanation could be that most countries with higher human capital endowment also had a higher
physical capital stock in the 1980s. So for the 1980s,H is a better measure of total capital stock (TK) because
it not only accounts for skills, but also implicitly takes into account ownership of physical capital (K). If this
is the case then H is clearly the correct measure to be used since it robustly captures a link between factor
ownership and policy that physical capital measures fail to do.
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One approach to resolve this is to combineH andK to obtain a single measure for TK. But this poses some
problems. Theoretically, aggregation of different forms of capital implicitly requires assumptions regarding
their substitutability or complementarity (See Balassa, 1979, pp. 260). We do not have such explicit knowledge
of the relationship between H and K across countries. In fact in the specific case of US trade, Branson and
Monoyios (1977) find that the correlation of net exports across commodities is negative and only “marginally
significant” with physical capital but, is positive and significant for human capital and negative and significant
for labor (pp. 113 and 117). So they advise against aggregation of physical and human capital measures.
Even if aggregation is theoretically justified in our case, it is difficult because of the nature of available
data. Physical capital data is available in value terms while human capital is in an index form. So, simple
aggregation is infeasible. We tried to combineH andK through two different methods. In the first one we used
the stock definition of total capital in Balassa (1979) to aggregateH andK. This required using the discounted
difference between skilled and unskilled wages as a proxy for human capital per worker. However using the
Freeman-Oostendrop dataset for wages, we were left with very few observations and could not implement this
approach. Lack of data also prevented us from using expenditure on schooling across countries to convert the
human capital indices into value form. In the second case, we used the Cobb-Douglas production coefficients
for human and physical capital as weights to construct a measure of total capital. This index did not support
the Mayer hypothesis. To ensure that the discreteness of human capital measures (as opposed to the continuous
value form of physical capital) was not responsible for the difference in results across these two forms of capital
in the 1980s, we used an index of physical capital instead but that did not satisfy the Mayer hypothesis in the
1980s either.
Thus given our limited success with physical capital in the 1980s, it is reasonable to consider the role of
private incentives to invest in different forms of capital. Viewed in the context of the Mayer model, if voters had
an incentive to invest in human capital in the 1980s, thenK would be more unequally distributed thanH during
the 80s. Thus the median voter’s trade preference would be largely determined by the impact of trade policy
on relative wages of skilled and unskilled labor, rather than on relative returns from ownership of physical
capital. This is consistent with previous literature on human capital accumulation. Becker (1980) stresses that
a greater share of small endowments will be placed in human capital if “small investments in human capital”
yield “considerably higher payoffs than those in physical capital” (pp. 130-33). For the US, Hornstein et al
(2005) report that returns to education rose dramatically in the 1980s and then grew at a slower pace in the
1990s.
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“The return to post-college education doubled from 1970 to 1990...The returns to experience
increased in the 1970s and the 1980s and leveled off in the 1990s.” (Hornstein et al, 2005, pp.
1283-85).
Hence during this time period, there was an incentive to invest in H . Consequently in the 1980s, H is the
primary factor of interest for the Mayer hypothesis and not K. Hornstein et al (2005) report further that in
the 1990s, the growth of returns to education had dampened in the US, but equipment-embodied productivity
growth was increasing substantially (pp. 1283 and 1293). This would imply that the median voter had an
incentive to invest in K as well. So both factors K and H assume a comparable level of importance in the
Mayer framework.10 Though these findings are limited to the US, they suggest a possible role for private
investment decisions which can be incorporated within the M-H-O framework to reconcile our different results
regarding the validity of the Mayer implication in the 1980s and the 1990s.
6 Large Country
Theoretical Model
Since the variation prediction is empirically validated in both time periods with human capital, we now take
the next step to test the M-H-O model. In this section, we retain the original M-H-O framework and extend
the model to the case of a large country. We define a “large” country as one that has the ability to manipulate
its terms of trade. In other words, holding tariff of the foreign country constant, if the change in world price
with respect to a change in domestic tariff is non-zero (pit 6= 0) then the domestic country is “large”. Following
Bagwell and Staiger (1999) we make standard assumptions regarding changes in prices with respect to tariffs.
In particular, we assume that a change in domestic tariff of a large home country has a strictly negative impact
on world relative price and vice-versa for the tariff (t∗) imposed by the foreign country.
Assumption (1). pit < 0 < dpdt and pit∗ > 0 >
dp∗
dt∗ .
Given t∗, individual i in the domestic country chooses a tariff level that maximizes her indirect utility
function U
(
p
(
pi(ti, t∗), ti
)
, yi
)
. With single-peaked preferences, the median voter theorem implies that the
10DM recognize the importance of human capital in their paper as well (pp. 112). But they argue that in the 1980s, physical capital is a
good proxy for total capital and therefore, it reflects ownership of human capital as well. However, our results reveal otherwise - H rather
than K is the correct measure to be used in the Mayer framework.
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tariff adopted in the country is
t˜ = t˜mv =
(
− Y
pi dMdt
)(
dφmv
dt
φmv
)
+ ToT (7)
where
dφmv
dt
=
[
L
(Y − T )2
]
(1− σmv)K
(
r
dw
dt
− wdr
dt
)
ToT =
[
pi
E∗
dE∗
dpi
]−1
=
1
Export Supply Elasticity of good 1
As in Mayer’s small country model, the first component of the optimal tariff is positive in a capital-abundant
country and negative in a labor abundant country. But unlike the small country model, there is a non-zero
second term which is positive for all large countries. This implies that the median voter in a capital-abundant
country always favors positive import tariffs. On the other hand, the median voter in a capital-scarce country
favors positive import tariffs if her country has sufficient market power in its import market i.e. Y
(
dφmv
dt
φmv
)
is greater than
(−pi dMdt )ToT . Defining the median voter’s factor share elasticity as eφmvt ≡ tφmv dφmvdt and
the world price elasticity as epit ≡ tpi dpidt , we can re-write the condition for positive tariffs as piMY >
eφmvt
epit
.
Thus, as long as the share of imports to GDP exceeds the ratio of median voter’s factor share elasticity to world
price elasticity, a labor-abundant country will impose positive tariffs on its imports. In this case, the positive
impact of the terms of trade component outweighs the negative impact of the median voter component so
sufficiently large labor-abundant countries impose positive tariffs. The import subsidization result of the Mayer
level prediction is overturned while the Mayer relationship between tariffs and the median voter component is
preserved. In particular, as in the Mayer level prediction, the first component of Equation (7) is always positive
for a capital-abundant country and negative for a capital-scarce country.
Proposition. Large Country Level Prediction:
The optimal tariff is a sum of the median voter component and a terms of trade component. When Assump-
tion (1) holds,
1. The median voter in a capital-abundant country supports tariffs on imports because both the median
voter and the terms of trade components are positive.
2. The terms of trade component in a large labor-abundant country is positive while the median voter
component is negative. If the country has sufficient market power so that piMY >
eφmvt
epit
, the positive
impact of the terms of trade component outweighs the negative impact of the median voter component
and the median voter in a capital-scarce country supports tariffs on imports.
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Thus the unrealistic result of import subsidization in a capital-scarce country does not hold if the country is
sufficiently engaged in the world market. Olarreaga et al (1999) remark that “the relevance of the “small”
country assumption may be limited to a small number of cases, as Mercosur represents only 1 per cent of world
markets, but terms-of-trade effects seem to be relatively important” (pp. 23). Therefore it is likely that several
countries across the world can be considered sufficiently large. This implies that the level prediction may not
be unrealistic after all.
Importantly from Equation (7), it is clear that the large country extension preserves the variation prediction.
The expression for ∂t˜∂σmv is the same, irrespective of the size of a country.
Proposition. Large Country Variation Prediction:
Higher inequality causes tariff rates to rise in capital-rich countries and to fall in capital-scarce ones.
Thus results from the previous section are valid for both small and large countries. We summarize these
Mayer hypotheses in Table 6.
Table 6: Variation and Level Predictions of the Mayer Model for Small & Large Countries
Country Type Assumptions r dwdt − w drdt dφ
mv
dt ToT t˜
dt˜
dσmv
Level Variation
Small K-abundant pit = 0 + + 0 + -
Small L-abundant pit = 0 - - 0 - +
Large K-abundant pit < 0 < dpdt + + + + -
Large L-abundant pit < 0 < dpdt - - + ? +
piM
Y >
eφmvt
epit
- - + + +
Empirical Model: Large Country Level Prediction
The variation prediction is unchanged when we consider large countries. So this section contains the
empirical model to test the level prediction for the large country case. Using the expressions for dφ
mv
dt , we can
rewrite Equation (7) as follows
t˜ =
(
− Y
pi dMdt
)(
dφmv
dt
φmv
)
+ ToT
=
(
− Y
pi dMdt
)(
L
(Y−T )2 (1− σmv)K
(
r dwdt − w drdt
)
φmv
)
+ ToT
= θmvMV+ ToT
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where θmv ≡ − (r
dw
dt −w drdt )
φmvpi dMdt
andMV = LY(Y−T )2 (1− σmv)K. We constructMV from available data on GDP,
taxes, capital and inequality. From the Mayer level prediction, θmv is negative in labor-abundant countries
and positive in capital-abundant countries. Thus MV decreases tariff levels in labor-abundant countries and
increases tariff levels in capital-abundant countries.
In the absence of cross-country export supply elasticity estimates, we impose more structure on the import
demand and export supply curves. We adopt the assumptions made in Bagwell and Staiger (2006). In particular,
demand for good 1 in the home country is given by D1 = a1d − b1dp while supply of good 1 in the foreign
country is given by S∗1 = a
∗
1s + b
∗
1spi and a1j , a
∗
1j , b1j , b
∗
1j are strictly positive for j = d, s. Defining b1 ≡
b1d + b1s and b∗1 ≡ b∗1d + b∗1s, we get that pit = −b1pi/(b1 + b∗1) which yields ToT = M/b∗1pi and elasticity
of import demand in the foreign country η∗ = b∗1pi/M
∗. So we use data on imports and import elasticities to
construct the terms of trade component as ToT = M/M∗η∗. Since the ToT component increases the adopted
tariff in the home country, we expect its impact on tariffs to be positive for all countries.11
Accordingly, we specify the following estimating equation
t˜c = θ1MVc + θ2MVckc + θ3kc + θtotToTc + Z
′
cζ + εc (8)
where Zc denotes a vector of control variables while θ and ζ are parameters to be estimated. In order to test the
level prediction, once again we need to estimate the threshold value k∗. We use the DMmethod of incorporating
an interaction term to endogenously generate k∗ and to estimate θ.12 We include an interaction term for ToT
and non-membership in the WTO to allow the ToT term to vary by membership status. This follows from the
terms of trade theory of trade agreements which implies that members will re-adjust their tariffs to overcome
the ToT externality. We expect the coefficient on the interaction term for non-WTO member countries to be
positive since tariff bindings tend to lower the ability to manipulate terms of trade.
We estimate Equation (8) and then test whether signs on the key variables agree with those predicted by the
extended M-H-O model as summarized in Table 7.
Since our construction of the ToT variable uses import and elasticity data, this formulation leads us to
a potential inconsistency of the OLS estimates due to endogeneity of imports and tariffs. As a result we use
instrumental variable (IV) regressions. Following the gravity equation literature and work by Broda et al (2006),
11We do not have elasticity and import data for all countries in the world. So the denominator of the ToT variable will be smaller by
the same amount for all countries in the sample. Hence, we do not expect to obtain a slope parameter equal to one for the ToT term.
12Note that (1 − σmvc )kc is a part of MVc. So by the variation prediction, we must obtain another critical ratio. But (1 − σmvc ) is
positive across countries, so both turning points are equal. Thus, the split obtained from k∗ is enough to guarantee that the median voter
component and the tariff-inequality relationship are negative in countries with kc < k∗ and positive in countries with kc > k∗. Hence
the variation and level predictions are consistent with each other.
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Table 7: Level Prediction Test
Variable Coef. Exp. Sign
MV θ1 (-)
MV · k θ2 (+)
ToT θtot (+)
we use GDP as an instrument for the terms of trade variable. Unfortunately we cannot use threshold regression
estimation for the level test due to lack of results for IV estimation without the convergence assumption and
due to the small size of our sample. However we provide non-parametric estimates to cross-check our results
for Equation (8).
Level Test: Data
Summary statistics for import-weighted elasticities, units of imports, share in world imports and the median
voter term (MV ) are provided in Table 8.
Table 8: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
MV 35 1.2 1.35 0.03 5.4
M -wtd. Elasticity 35 1.1 0.065 1.03 1.33
M (bn units) 35 671 1,732.8 8.68 9,225.7
M Share (%) 68 0.7 2.14 0.007 16.21
In our sample, the median voter term is highest in Norway and lowest in Madagascar. Elasticity is lowest
in Nicaragua and high in USA and India. None of the countries in our sample have zero imports. Imports are
lowest in Madagascar and highest in USA. Import shares range from 0.014 per cent (Malawi and Mali) to 16.3
per cent (USA).
Level Test: Results
Results of the level test using Q3 and elasticity data for the period 1988-2002 are given below. Column (a)
of Table 9 contains results for the small country version while column (b) contains results for the large country
version (Equation 8) of the level prediction.
Table 9 shows that the median voter variable and the interaction term are both statistically significant and
have the expected signs. This implies that the median voter component is positive in all countries with human
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capital greater than HKI* and vice-versa (See Figure 4). The critical HKI* is similar to the turning point from
the variation test (Table 14(a)). When the ToT variable is used in the IV regression, three countries - China,
Ghana and Tunisia - switch to the high HKI category. Overall the categorization of countries is fairly consistent
across the variation and level tests. Inclusion of terms of trade variables increases theR2 from 0.37 to over 0.45.
The terms of trade component is positive and significant so we find evidence that market power increases tariff
levels across countries. The interaction between non-membership status and ToT has the expected positive sign
suggesting higher terms of trade manipulation among non-members of the WTO. However we have only two
non-members in the sample so this must be interpreted with caution.
Table 9: Dependent Variable: Trade Restrictiveness Index
ToT = MM∗η∗ ToT = M
Variable Coef. Exp. Sign a) OLS b) IV c) IV
MV θ1 (-) -15.37*** -17.14*** -18.12***
(3.38) (3.6) (3.67)
MV ·HKI θ2 (+) 10.29*** 12.01*** 12.87***
(2.26) (2.59) (2.72)
HKI -0.279*** -0.351*** -0.374***
(.074) (0.086) (0.092)
ToT θToT (+) 3.078** 0.023*
(1.53) (0.011)
NM·ToT (+) 0.452*** 0.005***
(0.131) (0.001)
Cons. 0.61*** 0.096 0.325
(0.134) (0.289) (0.198)
N 33 33 33
R2 0.36 0.46 0.48
Imports Units Value
HKI* 1.5 1.43 1.4
Figure 4: Estimated Median Voter Component (MVc) by Human Capital Endowment
EstimatedMVc <>0 forHKI
<
>1.43, Corresponds to Table 9 (b)
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Figure 5: TRI, Human Capital,MV and ToT (1990s): Non-Parametric Estimation
Local Estimation: θ1 < 0, θ2 > 0 and θtot > 0
Level Test: Robustness Check
Estimation
Once again using locally weighted least squares smoothing for Equation (8), we find that the non-parametric
relationships between trade barriers and the key variables have the signs of the Mayer level prediction (Figure
5). The local TRI-MV curve is negatively sloped while the TRI-MV *HKI curve is positively sloped. The
TRI-ToT curve is positively sloped as expected from the large country version of the Mayer level prediction.
Alternative Method
The assumptions to arrive at the ToT expression are admittedly strong. So we outline an alternative ap-
proach proposed by Olarreaga et al (1999) and use it to cross-check our empirical results. Formally, let T
denote the entire world andMj denote the import demand of country j. Then the supply of the imported good
E∗c to country c can be derived using the equilibrium relationship E
∗
j = Mj .
E∗c = E
∗
T −
∑
j 6=c
E∗j = E
∗
T −
∑
j 6=c
Mj
Let ej denote the elasticity of export supply faced by country j, ηj denote the elasticity of import demand
of country j and λj ≡ E∗j /E∗T denote the share of country j in the world market. Differentiating the above
equation with respect to world price yields the export supply elasticity ec faced by country c as a function of
its import share λc.
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ec =
1
λc
eT −∑
j 6=c
λjηj

Using this equation, Olarreaga et al (1999) argue that a “preferred” proxy for the terms of trade component
(e−1c ) is the import share of country c in world markets λc since it avoids availability and measurement problems
associated with trade elasticities. So following Olarreaga et al (1999), we use import shares as a proxy for ToT
and find that the extended level prediction is empirically valid (Table 9(c)).
Data, Variables and Endogeneity
Our qualitative results are not sensitive to use of value or quantities of imports. We use logs in either case
to avoid high imports from influencing our results. The qualitative results are similar when population is used
instead of GDP as an instrument.
During our sample period, developing country members of the WTO did not have to bind tariffs to the
extent required of the developed country members. So we included an interaction term for the terms of trade
component of developing country members. In all regressions, the interaction term was positive as expected
but statistically insignificant. Our qualitative results for the level prediction were not affected by inclusion of
the interaction term.
Following the insight of Tomz, Goldstein and Rivers (2007) that some nonmember participants benefited
from the GATT, we also checked if controlling for de facto membership of the GATT has any impact on
our qualitative results. There is only one de facto member of the GATT in our sample (Algeria). Excluding
this observation or using a dummy variable to control for its effect merely strengthens our qualitative results.
Similar results hold when oil exporters are included.
It has been argued in the public finance literature that tariffs may be preferred to other forms of taxation as
they can be collected more easily. So it may be possible that our results are driven by the differential ability of
high-income and low-income countries in finding alternative sources of revenue.13 Therefore we use total tax
revenue (per cent of GDP) as a control variable in our regressions. All results are robust (and in fact stronger)
when total tax revenue is included as an explanatory variable.
Thus during the 1990s, we find evidence of both the Mayer median voter hypothesis and the terms of
trade argument for tariff-setting. Capital-abundant countries tend to have higher tariffs while labor-abundant
countries tend to have lower tariffs on account of general interest considerations. Terms of trade considerations
13See Baunsgaard and Keen (2005) and Gehlbach (2006) for discussion and empirical evidence.
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exert a positive influence on tariff levels while WTO membership tends to lower tariff levels.
7 Conclusion
We have tested the Mayer variation prediction using physical capital and labor as well as human capital
and labor. Our results show that the Mayer implication finds strong support using human capital but not
physical capital in the 1980s. However in the 1990s, the Mayer implication holds with either factor. A possible
explanation for our different findings is that the median voter’s incentive to invest in different forms of capital
changed over the two time periods. Therefore the factors of interest for the Mayer implication changed over
time. Our results suggest that voters’ decisions regarding choice of investment are relevant issues which can be
explored in future research.
The empirical relevance of the Mayer median voter model goes beyond its variation prediction. We extend
the Mayer level prediction to large countries. Tariffs in a large country Mayer model are a sum of the median
voter component and a positive terms of trade component. Thus the import subsidization result of Mayer (1984)
is overcome for large labor-abundant countries.
We test the extended level prediction and find support for it during the 1990s. At even our highly aggregate
cross-country level, we find a positive terms of trade component in tariffs. Our results reveal that the median
voter component has a negative impact on tariffs in labor-abundant countries and a positive impact in capital-
abundant countries. Thus labor-abundant countries tend to be “pro-trade” while capital-abundant countries tend
to be “protectionists” as predicted by the median voter theorem. However it remains to be tested whether our
level test results generalize to other countries and time periods. Future work in this regard can shed more light
on the importance of general interest and terms of trade considerations in determining the direction of tariffs
adopted across countries.
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Appendix A: Disenfranchisement14
In this Section we present a formal explanation for why countries with low political rights will bias results based
on the median voter theorem. Our reasoning is simple. Lowering political rights increases the importance of
wealthy individuals in the political process, effectively overrepresenting the rich while disenfranchising the
poor. Consequently, estimates using inequality measurements from countries with low political rights will be
biased since the “effective median voter” disproportionately reflects the interests of the rich.
Let W stand for wealth and let fW (w) denote the distribution of wealth across the population within a
particular country. We will denote the maximum observed wealth as w. For example, per capita wealth is given
by
∫ w
0
wfW (w)dw. In order to capture the effect of political rights in a country, r, we introduce the idea of
disenfranchisement. In the UN’s terminology,
“Rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person.”
for our purposes, this is in opposition to
“Rights derived from status, privilege, and influence associated with wealth.”
First we consider a country where all individuals are equal in terms of their voice in governance. We should
expect that a group of individuals with wealth in [w1, w2] should have “effective voting mass” equal to their
“population mass”. Formally,
Effective voting mass of individuals in [w1, w2] ≈
∫ w2
w1
fW (w)dw
However, in a country with low political rights we should expect that those with great wealth have a voice
in governance disproportionate to their population mass.15 In other words, in a country with low political
rights we should expect that poor individuals are disenfranchised which suggests the following heuristic of
disenfranchisement
Effective voting mass of wealthy >
∫
Wealthy
fW (w)dw
Effective voting mass of poor <
∫
Poor
fW (w)dw
A natural way to introduce disenfranchisement is then to weight the population mass by a function of wealth
and rights, say e(w, r) (for enfranchisement) where we assume that:
1. Enfranchisement e(w, r) is normalized for each r∫ w
0
e(w, r)fW (w)dw = 1
2. For rights r, less political rights r′ < r magnifies disenfranchisement in the sense that
r′ < r implies e(w,r
′)
e(w,r) is strictly increasing in w
When political rights r′ are less that rights r for sufficiently low wealth wL, “poor” individuals are less en-
franchised under r′ than under r, formally e(wL, r′) < e(wL, r). Also, “rich” individual with sufficiently high
wealth wH are more enfranchised under r′ than under r, formally e(wH , r′) > e(wH , r). So (2) captures the
14The argument for disenfranchisement is due to John Morrow.
15Or at least disproportionate relative to those countries with higher political rights. Our formal definition cares only about relative
differences.
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idea that as rights decrease, the poor have increasingly less “effective votes” and the wealthy have increasingly
more “effective votes.” Given an enfranchisement function e(w, r), we definemr as the effective median voter
with rights r by
mr ≡
∫ mr
0
e(w, r)fw(w)dw =
1
2
(9)
Proposition. (Rights) Lowering political rights increases the wealth level of the effective median voter.16
Proof. Fix some level of rights r and suppose r′ < r. The effective median voter at the two rights levels,
say mr and m′r, are given by (9), and we intend to show that mr′ > mr. Define h(w) by h(w) ≡ e(w,r
′)
e(w,r) and
since each e is continuous in w and and > 0 on [0, w], so is h. From 2, h is also strictly increasing in w. Now
define
g(z) ≡
∫ z
0
e(w, r)fW (w)dw −
∫ z
0
e(w, r′)fW (w)dw
=
∫ z
0
e(w, r)fW (w)[1− h(w)]dw (10)
Clearly g is continuous and it follows from 1 that g(0) = g(1) = 0. Examining 10, since h < 1 implies
g(1) > 0 and h > 1 implies g(1) < 0 there exist w1, w2 with h(w1) > 1 > h(w2). By continuity of h there
exists a w∗ s.t. h(w∗) = 1 and since by 2 h is strictly increasing, this w∗ is unique. Examination of 10 shows
that
g(z) is strictly increasing on [0, w∗]
g(z) is strictly decreasing on [w∗, w]
Since g(0) = g(1) = 0, this implies that g > 0 on (0, w). In particular, we have
g(mr) =
∫ mr
0
e(w, r)fW (w)dw −
∫ mr
0
e(w, r′)fW (w)dw
=
1
2
−
∫ mr
0
e(w, r′)fW (w)dw > 0
so that
∫mr
0
e(w, r′)fW (w)dw < 12 which impliesmr′ > mr as desired.
Appendix B
Trade Restrictiveness Index
The TRI is defined as the uniform tariff that would maintain imports of the country at the same level as the
existing tariff structure i.e.,
TRIc|
∑
n
mc,n(TRIc) =
∑
n
mc,n(tc,n) = m0c
where, mc,n is the import of good n by country c, m0c is its existing import bundle and tc,n is its current
protection level (tariffs, duties, tariff equivalents of NTBs) for each import good n. It captures the trade
“distortions imposed by each country’s trade policies on its import bundle”. (Kee et al, 2006). If we totally
differentiate the above equation, we get that
TRIc =
∑
n
(
dmc,n
dpc,n
)
tc,n∑
n
(
dmc,n
dpc,n
)
16We will also assume the following regularity conditions: fW and e(·, r) are continuous in w and > 0 on [0, w].
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where pc,n is the price of good n in country c. So, TRIc is a weighted average of trade restrictions in country
c.
Additional Empirical Results
This part contains results that correspond to regressions reported in the main body of the paper. We include
results for endogeneity tests since trade policy can affect the production structure of the economy, which in
turn would have an impact on accumulation and the steady state level of capital. Moreover, trade policy can
affect inequality in the country. Endogeneity yields inconsistent OLS estimates so we follow the approach
taken by Li et al (1998) and used in DM to test for endogeneity bias. The suspected endogenous variables
are σmv , σmvk and k. As in DM, we use instrumental variables - saving and population growth rates (Solow
growth model parameters), land gini (measure of initial distribution of land), ratio of money (M2) to GDP
(measure of financial development), civil liberties (measure of political factors as a structural variable) and the
exogenous variables in the regression equation for auxiliary regressions of our suspected endogenous variables.
The residuals are then used as right-hand side variables and tested for their joint significance. In our main
regressions, we do not encounter any endogeneity problems so all results are reported in the corresponding
tables. DM do not report instrumental variable regression results for the Summers-Heston and Easterly-Levine
datasets. But using the Nehru-Dhareshwar dataset, they find endogeneity in only one regression using tariffs.
Physical Capital (1980s)
Table 10: Dependent Variable: Tariff
(a) (b) PR < 5 (c) (d) PR < 5
Gini -0.011 0.011 Q3 0.026 0.103†
(0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.07)
Gini * (K/L) 0.001 -0.001 Q3 * (K/L) -0.004 -0.011†
(0.00) (0.002) (0.01) (0.01)
(K/L) -0.115 -0.063 (K/L) 0.012 0.084
(0.08) (0.083) (0.10) (0.11)
Constant 1.164† 0.698 Constant 0.238 -0.611
(0.80) (0.84) (0.99) (1.08)
N 42 30 N 47 30
R2 0.5 0.7 R2 0.44 0.7
Endog. F-statistic 0.4 Endog. F-statistic 1.35
Endogeneity N 30 Endogeneity N 33
Joint test F-statistic Joint test F-statistic
(Gini and Gini*(K/L)) 1.28 0.69 (Q3 and Q3*(K/L)) 1.77 1.28
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Human Capital (1980s)
Table 11: Dependent Variable: Tariff
(a) (b) PR < 5 (c) (d) PR < 5
Gini -0.031*** -0.025 Q3 0.071* 0.148***
(0.01) (0.018) (0.04) (0.05)
Gini * HKI 0.022*** 0.016 Q3 * HKI -0.056** -0.1***
(0.01) (0.012) (0.03) (0.03)
HKI -1.109*** -1.03** HKI 0.662† 1.222**
(0.31) (0.441) (0.43) (0.50)
Constant 1.784*** 1.76** Constant -0.622 -1.612**
(0.48) 0.71 (0.61) (0.71)
N 42 30 N 47 32
R2 0.5 0.6 R2 0.4 0.6
Endog. F-statistic 1.25 Endog. F-statistic 1.65
Endogeneity N 34 Endogeneity N 33
HKI* 1.42 HKI* 1.27 1.49
HKI* = Critical HKI Value
Threshold Regression: Trade Barriers, Physical Capital and Human Capital (1980s)
Table 12: Dependent Variable: Tariff
Physical Capital (K/L) Human Capital (HKI)
(a) (b) PR < 5 (c) (d) PR < 5
Scarce Abun. Scarce Abun. Scarce Abun. Scarce Abun.
Gini -.004** .002 -.01*** .002 -.007** .007*** -.01*** .006**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Cons .44*** -.026 .81*** -.026 .55*** -.191** .89*** -.026
(0.1) (0.095) (0.151) (0.07) (0.12) (0.09) (0.151) (0.072)
Obs 22 20 11 19 19 23 11 19
N 42 30 42 30
R2 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.7
k∗ 9.96 (Sig.) 9.96 (Insig.) 1.5 (Sig.) 1.5 (Sig.)
Sig./Insig. = Significant/Insignificant at 5%
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Physical Capital (1990s)
Table 13: Dependent Variable: Trade Restrictiveness Index
(a) (b) PR < 5 (c) (d) PR < 5
Gini -0.017** -0.014** Q3 0.13*** 0.13**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.06)
Gini * (K/L) 0.002** 0.002** Q3 * (K/L) -0.014*** -0.014**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
(K/L) -0.088*** -0.071** (K/L) 0.19*** 0.195**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.076)
Constant 0.952*** 0.78*** Constant -1.67** -1.7**
(0.31) (0.31) (0.67) (0.762)
N 72 61 N 37 30
R2 0.15 0.15 R2 0.24 0.23
(K/L)* 8.9 8.7 (K/L)* 9.3 9.5
Human Capital (1990s)
Table 14: Dependent Variable: Trade Restrictiveness Index
(a) (b) PR < 5 (c) (d) PR < 5
Gini -0.014** -0.011** Q3 0.13** 0.175***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.055) (0.061)
Gini * HKI 0.009** 0.008** Q3 * HKI -0.08** -0.108***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.036)
HKI -0.451*** -0.364** HKI 1.12** 1.466***
(0.03) (0.15) (0.468) (0.491)
Constant 0.848*** 0.691*** Constant -1.584** -2.19***
(0.25) (0.25) (0.762) (0.803)
N 72 61 N 37 30
R2 0.2 0.2 R2 0.36 0.41
Endog. F-statistic 0.87 Endog. F-statistic 1.35
Endogeneity N 35 Endogeneity N 30
HKI* 1.5 1.44 HKI* 1.6 1.62
Threshold Regression: Trade Barriers, Physical Capital and Human Capital (1990s)
Table 15: Dependent Variable: TRI and Threshold Variable: (K/L)
Physical Capital (K/L) Human Capital (HKI)
(a) (b) PR < 5 (c) (d) PR < 5
Scarce Abun. Scarce Abun. Scarce Abun. Scarce Abun.
Gini -.004*** .003*** -.004*** .003*** -.004*** .003** -.005*** .003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Cons .36*** .014 .37*** .013 .37*** .034 .4*** .023
(0.07) (0.04) (0.08) (0.035) (0.07) (0.041) (0.08) (0.034)
Obs 26 46 17 44 30 42 15 46
N 72 61 72 61
R2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
k∗ 9.11 (Sig.) 9.11 (Sig.) 1.45 (Sig.) 1.45 (Sig.)
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